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Abstract
We conduct the rst empirical economic investigation of the decision to cheat by University
students. We investigate student demand for essays, using hypothetical discrete choice
experiments in conjunction with consequential Holt-Laury gambles to derive subjectsrisk
preferences. Students stated willingness to participate in the essay market, and their
valuation of purchased essays, vary with the characteristics of student and institutional
environment. Risk preferring students, those working in a non-native language, and those
believing they will attain a lower grade are willing to pay more. Purchase likelihoods and
essay valuations decline as the probability of detection and associated penalty increase.
JEL: I21; K42; D81; D82
keywords: cheating; choice experiment; mixed logit; risk preference; gamble; asymmetric information.
Research support from the universities of Manchester and Reading and the comments of Rachel Gri¢ th and James
Banks are gratefully acknowledged.
Contract Cheating & The Market In Essays
We conduct the rst empirical economic investigation of the decision to cheat by University
students. We investigate student demand for essays, using hypothetical discrete choice
experiments in conjunction with consequential Holt-Laury gambles to derive subjectsrisk
preferences. Students stated willingness to participate in the essay market, and their
valuation of purchased essays, vary with the characteristics of student and institutional
environment. Risk preferring students, those working in a non-native language, and those
believing they will attain a lower grade are willing to pay more. Purchase likelihoods and
essay valuations decline as the probability of detection and associated penalty increase.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates student cheating and the market in essays. The essay market is illicit and
growing. It creates information asymmetries and hence an economic problem since the signalling of
graduate quality via degree grade is weakened. Information asymmetries also characterize the market
for essays with student buyers frequently struggling to locate reputablesuppliers who will provide
essays that are both original and of the required quality. It is also characterized by strategic behavior,
with those essay companies selling lemons (Akerlof, 1970) having an incentive to disrupt buyers
attempts to gain reliable reputational information regarding suppliers.
The demand for essays involves the interplay of risk, penalties and the payo¤s and the ethics, norms
and risk preferences of the individual facing the option to buy. Since the internet has reduced the
search costs for potential buyers of illicit essays so markedly, the cheating market is constrained only
by supply side capacity and consumerswillingness to pay.
We investigate studentswillingness to pay for written to order essays supplied by commercial providers.
This is done by conducting hypothetical discrete choice experiments with university students in which
they choose over essays systematically di¤ering in terms of price and quality, the risk of detection and
the penalty if caught. The purchase and submission of such essays is risky, and such behavior will
be conditioned by the individuals risk preferences. We investigate this by deriving individual-specic
estimates of risk aversion, via a 2nd choice experiment over consequential gambles, which are included
in the essay choice model.
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We nd that half of our subjects indicate a willingness to buy one or more essays in the hypothetical
essay choice experiment. Students stated willingness to participate in the essay market, and their
implicit valuation of purchased essays, vary with the characteristics of student and institutional en-
vironment. Risk preferring students, those for whom English as an additional language, and those
expecting a lower grade are willing to pay more. Purchase likelihoods and essay valuations decline as
the probability of cheats being detected, and the penalties if caught, increase.
The structure of the paper is as follows: rst we summarize the position regarding plagiarism in
universities with specic emphasis on the rise of the market in essays. We then describe the study
design, present results from the two choice experiments conducted and discuss their implications.
2 Contract Cheating
The problem of plagiarism is growing in universities. A 2011 survey of over 1000 college presidents
in the US revealed that 55 percent thought that plagiarism was on the rise. Business Schools such
as those at UCLA and Penn State have recently begun scanning the admission essays of their MBA
applicants because of the scale of the problem (Parker et al., 2011). In the UK over 17 000 cases of
cheating were recorded at universities in 2009-10, an increase of 50 percent from four years previously.
There is an incentive to cheat both to enter (a better) university and also to secure a (higher grade)
degree. The prize is not only prestige but also economic; the average salary returns to higher education
are approximately 27 percent (Blundell et al., 2005). The grade of degree awarded matters also; in
the UK workers with higher grade degrees have wages 6 percent higher than other graduates 6 years
after graduation (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000).
Widespread cheating within universities weakens the information content of graduatesdegrees as an
indicator of their quality, and an information asymmetry results. There is for able, honest students
and for employers, universities and government, an incentive to reduce students cheating and the
corroded quality signals that result from it.
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We address a specic form of cheating whereby students order an assignment of a given standard to be
delivered in a given period at a xed price, known as Contract Cheating(CC, Clarke and Lancaster
2006). The Contract Cheating market has been boosted by technological change. First, technical
change has pushed cheaters into the CC market because the probability of detection of traditional
cut-and-paste plagiarism, and recycled papers, has increased with the greater use by universities of
scanning systems such as TurnItIn. Second, the internet has reduced to almost zero the potential
buyerssearch costs, facilitating rapid ordering, payment and delivery.
The purchasing process for work takes two main forms: the buyer commissions work at a xed price
(most sites) or, alternatively, posts the work and potential suppliers bid for the work with the buyer
in some cases able to see previous buyersratings of work done by bidding writers (eg vworker and,
historically, essaybay). The information available about this illicit industry is patchy and nearly all
concerns the supply side of the market; the UK CC market in CC was estimated to be worth £ 200m
in 2006 with one company (UKEssays) reported to have 3,500 writers. Little is known about the
demand side of the market.
While the internet has reduced the costs of locating suppliers hugely, the di¢ culties of assessing
online suppliersquality are substantial. Information asymmetry characterizes the Contract Cheating
market as well as the graduate labour market: lemon essays exist as well as lemon graduates. For the
cheat there are 2 forms of lemon essay, which di¤er regarding the point of revelation of the essays
poor quality. The purchased essay may be original and impervious to detection, but not match the
prescribed quality (too low, too high) something only revealed after purchase, via the students or
graders assessment. Alternatively, if the work is unoriginal it is likely to be detected via scanning and
the customer identied as a cheat.1
Observation of the essay market suggests it is awash with lemons. Forums on sites such as essay-
chat.com and www.essayscam.org are dominated by appeals for information on reliable companies or
the airing of grievances toward sites from both buyers (for non delivery or delivery of low quality work)
and writers (for non-payment). Information asymmetries and the lack of recourse for buyers (PayPal
1Many essay companies respond to buyer fraud (for example the buyer using a stolen credit card) by posting the sold
essay online so it will become incorporated within TurnItIns database and the fraudulent plagiarizer caught.
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will not refund buyers since they dene essays as intangible goodswhich are excluded from their
dispute resolution framework.) create large numbers of disgruntled, defrauded customers.
The aspiring cheat is su¤ering because the good essays are being driven out by the bad. The incentive
to reduce the information asymmetry exists for both good companies and buyers. The beneciaries of
the market failing are bad companies, and also honest students, universities and employers. Buyers
try to reduce the information asymmetry by seeking reputational information in these online forums.
Monitoring of these forums and the claims and counter-claims that ll them suggests that bad com-
panies are systematically sabotaging these attempts by churning these information ows.
There are very few economic analyses of the students decision to cheat and none of the contract
cheating market. Research in education has found that those with high intrinsic motivation, who regard
study as being conducted for its own sake, are less likely to cheat than those who exhibit extrinsic
motivation and regard study as a means to an end (Davy et al., 2007; Murdock and Anderman, 2006).
In addition, perceptions of social norms regarding cheating, especially those of the persons cohort
or peer group, are found to a¤ect the likelihood of cheating (McCabe et al., 1997; ORourke et al.,
2010). An alternative, but related, perspective comes from the economics of crime and punishment,
and rational choice (Becker, 1968). Collins et al. (2007) and Quandt (2010) develop theoretical models
of student cheating within an expected utility framework. Their models have intuitive outcomes: the
presence and extent of cheating depends on both institutional parameters (detection probabilities
and penalties) and individualscharacteristics (preferences for grades and risks). If the utility costs
associated with detection are large enough, then even opportunities for cheating which have zero direct
costs and low detection rates will not be exploited. Further, the utility costs of detection depend upon
the interaction of the penalties imposed and the individuals characteristics.
There is evidence that for some even a zero detection probability would not induce them to cheat.
A recurrent nding in experimental studies is that while a signicant proportions of subjects will
act dishonestly whenever there is an economic payo¤, others will avoid dishonesty in all cases. The
nding that a substantial proportion refuse to lie even in situations where all parties benet from
the lie (a pareto white lie) supports the idea of pure lie aversion (Erat and Gneezy, 2012) implying
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some students will never enter the essay market regardless of market and institutional conditions.
A third group, the partially dishonest, may be induced to act dishonestly as inter alia the payo¤,
the degree of anonymity and the impact of their dishonesty on others are moderated (Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi, López-Pérez and Spiegelman, Gneezy et al). A commonly cited explanation of
partial dishonesty (for example lying to increase a payo¤ but not to the fullest extent possible) is the
maintenance of a favourable self-concept. People act in a way that their behavior and associated
gains are not su¢ cient to prompt an irresolvable conict between the act and their self-perception:
People often resolve this conict through creative reassessments and self-serving rational-
izations . . . such that they can act dishonestly enough to prot from their unethicality but
honestly enough to maintain a positive self-concept(Gino et al., 2013: 285-286).
These creative reassessments and rationalizations are observed in studies of plagiarism in which exces-
sive workload pressures, poor teaching, poor guidance on academic practice and the need to cheat in
order to keep up with many other cheaters in the class are all justications cited by plagiarists (see De-
vlin and Gray, 2007). However the purchase of essays may place a greater strain on the behaviour-self
image relationship than traditional copy and paste plagiarism, being viewed by some as qualitatively
di¤erent from traditional plagiarism, as bador blatantcheating (Sisti, 2007). How such behavior
is perceived in terms of its e¤ect on others, and the how personal the dishonesty is perceived as be-
ing, are likely to a¤ect the willingness to undertake the act, in addition to the degree of private gain
(Cappelen et al. 2013). One might expect some students to never buy essays while others will if there
are gains to be had; others will only cheat if those gains are su¢ cient to outweigh the risks and costs,
subject to the maintenance of self-image.
In this study the interplay of institutional parameters (risk of detection and penalty) and personal
characteristics (academic ability, risk preferences) in generating the demand for essays are analyzed
empirically, within a formal framework, for the rst time. We examine the demand for essays, and
how their value varies with the characteristics of both essay and buyer. We analyze how the stated
willingness to pay for an essay varies with its quality, the risk of being caught and the penalty
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associated with detection. The cost and quality will be determined in the market. The penalty will
be set by the university, while the risk of detection is a function of both the universitys actions and
the functioning of the market (whether a cherry or lemon is bought). The relevant characteristics
of the buyer include, inter alia, their risk preferences, their abilities in the subject matter and their
opportunity costs of time.
3 Study Design
In common with other illicit markets (Pudney, 2003; Cook et al. 2007) direct observation of prices
and demand levels in the essay market is problematic; prices can be observed but many are for lemon
essays and demand is unobserved. The absence of good revealed preference data prompts us to use
a stated preference approach to investigate the nature of demand for essays. We use a hypothetical
discrete choice experiment (DCE) to investigate studentswillingness to pay for essays. Such choice
experiments are widely used in, inter alia, health (San Miguel et al., 2006), food (Aoki et al., 2010)
and transport (Hensher and Greene, 2003) economics. Their theoretical underpinnings originate in
Lancaster (1966) and the decomposition of a products value into the sum of the values of its attributes.
This theoretical framework was made operational with the development of Random Utility Theory
(RUT) and associated statistical models of choice (McFadden, 1974).
Respondents in a discrete choice experiment are presented with repeated choice sets. Each option
within the sets is comprised of a series of attributes which vary in level. Respondents identify which of
the options they prefer. With su¢ cient responses across a su¢ ciently wide range of choice situations,
one can estimate the implicit weight given to attributeslevels in the choices that have been made.
Further, one can analyze the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between attribute levels and,
where a monetary attribute is included, the MRS between the monetary attribute and non monetary
attributes represents the willingness to pay (WTP) for changes in attribute levels.
In this study we conduct two choice experiments. The rst, hypothetical, concerns essays, the second,
consequential, is over gambles. The objective of the second DCE is to identify individuals risk
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preferences since we believe a priori that these will be important in explaining willingness to pay
for the illicit essays. The recruitment process and structure of the two experiments are now outlined.
4 Recruitment
To make the essay choice scenarios as realistic as possible they had to be presented in the context of
a specic piece of work that was due to be submitted not long after the experiment was conducted.
The process conducted at 3 UK universities2 was to identify a 2nd/3rd year undergraduate course
which had a largely textual assignment, due soon, which accounted for a signicant proportion of the
units nal mark. Then, with the approval of the unit lecturer, students were invited to attend the
experiment which was held 2-3 weeks before the submission date. At the session the precise purpose
and format of the experiment was explained (see online Appendix) and students given the opportunity
to leave (none did). It was made clear that the research was unequivocally based on condentiality,
and had been approved by a University Research Ethics Committee on that basis.
Students completed a hard copy survey containing sections concerning demographics and educational
past, views and experiences of plagiarism, and the essay and gamble choice sets. This was collected
at the sessions end with students retaining a separate sheet on which they had recorded their gamble
choices. An on-screen random number generator was used to determine (i) which of the gambles was
to be played out for payment, and (ii) the outcome of the selected gamble. Students then handed in
their gamble choice sheet and received payment in cash (attendance fee + gamble winnings) as they
left the room.
2 Identied here only as Universities A, B and C
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5 Choice experiment over essays
Students were asked to consider purchasing essays for the forthcoming unit assignment. The essays
di¤ered in terms of 4 attributes: price, grade3, risk and penalty, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1 here
Dening attribute levels close to those observed in the illicit essay market was problematic. Although
many prices are observable the proliferation of scam sites means that many (possibly most) are not
associated with an essay of the necessary quality. Clarke and Lancaster (2013) tabulate prices on
vWorker and Freelancer sites identifying 21 jobs completed for one contractor which averaged £ 71
when dissertations are excluded, and jobs for 13 writers which had prices ranging between £ 43 and
£ 300. The risk attribute levels were also problematic since the number of commercially sourced essays
submitted is unknown, as are the numbers detected. Given the reported scale of the industry the
number of disciplinary cases involving Contract Cheating appears tiny suggesting that either buyers
arent submitting or, more plausibly to us, a tiny fraction of those submitted are detected. We regarded
the levels selected as credible but not denitive, and we were interested in whether respondentsessay
choices would be signicantly a¤ected by variation in the 2 risk levels presented.
An experimental design maximizing D-E¢ ciency4 (Ferrini and Scarpa, 2007) was generated to combine
the attributes and levels into options and sets. The design comprised 2 blocks of 8 choice sets with
each set comprising 4 alternatives. Respondents were randomly allocated to either block of 8 essay
choice sets. The 4th alternative in each set was a buy noneoption. An example essay choice set is
shown in Figure 1 .
Figure 1 here
One element of purchasing an essay in the real market is absent from the set up used in the choice
3The UK undergraduate system classies marks as: 70%+ [1st class], 60-69% [Upper Second: 2(i)], 50-59% [Lower
Second: 2(ii)] and 40-49% [a 3rd]. Marks below 40% are classied as fails.
4D-e¢ ciency is essentially a method that ensures the choice sets are arranged so as to obtain the lowest possible
standard errors when the model is estimated for a given sample size. For a more complete description readers are
referred to (Ferrini and Scarpa, 2007) as a starting reference.
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experiment: uncertainty over the essays quality. As discussed above the essay market features many
lemons. This could be incorporated by including an additional attribute which captures uncertainty
in essay quality. This was excluded because of the additional cognitive load associated with a second
probability appearing in the choice sets and because sample size was thought likely to be a constraint
on identifying the e¤ects of more attributes.
The buy noneoption warrants some further comment. It comprises an essay with zero penalty, risk
and price and of the grade the student predicts they will obtain if they write the essay themselves.
Consequently we asked the participating students for a predicted grade if they were to submit their
own assignment.
This grade prediction varies over students, and denes the noneoption in each of their choice sets.
This emphasizes an important issue regarding the design of a study of this nature. A student may be
prepared to buy an essay for one course unit in which they struggle, but not in another in which they
excel. This means that research into the demand for papers should be conducted regarding specic
course units, it can not be done meaningfully in a generic context.
6 Choice experiment over gambles
We expect individualsrisk preferences to a¤ect their willingness to buy, and their marginal valuations
of, essays of di¤ering quality. As risk preferences are unobservable we conduct a second, consequential,
DCE, over gambles, to estimate them. We employ a lottery design based on Holt and Laury (2002,
see Charness et al., 2013, for an overview) in which students choose a preferred gamble to play from
a series of pairs (e.g. A or B in Figure 2). To ensure all choices were consequential, it was explained
that one of the gambles would be selected at random and played at the end of the session, with the
associated rewards paid in cash.
Figure 2 here
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7 Modelling Choice
The analysis of the choice experiment data for both essays and gambles is based on Random Utility
Theory, and extensions of the conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974). We outline the approach in
general here before specifying the detail of the econometric implementation for the essay and gamble
choice data, which di¤ered.
Assume individual i is faced with a choice situation t with M alternatives with the attributes in the
mth choice set dened as the vector zitm: We denote Zit = fzitmgMm=1 as the set of attributes dening
choice situation t for individual i and i as the parameters dening the ith individuals utility function.
The probability that person i in choice situation t selects alternative m is given by:
P (yit = m j Zit; i) (1)
The conditional logit model of this probability is given by:
P (yit = m j Zit; i) =
exp
 
Vmjzitm;i

PM
m0=1 exp

Vm0jzitm0;i
 (2)
where Vmjzitm;i is the systematic component of utility derived from the attributeslevels, which di¤er
across alternatives, and the additive random component of utility is drawn from a Gumbel distribution
(see Train, 2003). We now outline the specication of the RUT models employed for the analysis of
choice over gambles and essays, beginning with the former.
7.1 Modelling Gamble Choices
The purpose of the analysis of the choice of gamble from the pairs o¤ered is to derive a measure of
risk aversion for each individual. These risk preferences are then to be used to explain choices over
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essays. The decision to cheat may be viewed as an economic gamble and thus attitudes toward risk,
revealed by choices over monetary gambles, may also explain the decision to cheat5.
We consider two approaches. The rst is rooted in Expected Utility Theory (EUT). The second
approach expresses risk preferences in terms of the distributional moments of uncertain monetary
outcomes. A bridge between the two approaches can be constructed by appealing to Taylor ap-
proximations (Levy and Markowitz, 1979) or by making distributional assumptions such as normally
distributed payo¤s or, more generally, location-scale restrictions (Meyer, 1987). The well documented
anomalies of EUT (see Rabin and Thaler 2001) have spawned many alternative approaches to con-
ceptualizing behavior under risk such as Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and rst
orderrisk aversion (Epstein and Zin, 1990). It is the second of these approaches that we explore here
as an alternative to EUT.
The expected utility approach is implemented using the expo-power utility function employed by Holt
and Laury (2002). The moment approach uses the rst and second moments of the gamble payo¤
distribution. Both approaches are implemented via estimation of mixed (random parameter) logit
models (Revelt and Train, 1998).
The expected utility approach uses the utility function:
Ui (witm) =   exp

 i (!i + witm)i

(3)
where !i is the (unobserved) wealth of individual i, witm is a monetary amount presented within
alternative t in gamble m, and i and i are individual-specic parameters to be estimated. The
absolute Risk aversion for the individual is -U
00
i
U 0i
= ii (!i + witm)
 1   (i   1) (!i + witm) 1. The
expected utility of a gamble between two monetary amounts witm and witm with probabilities pitm
and 1  pitm is therefore:
V G;EUTitm = (pitmUi (witm) + (1  pitm)Ui (witm)) (4)
5Estimates of risk aversion may be context specic. We are interested in whether estimates of risk aversion derived
from the gamble choices provide information that can help rationalise choices in the essay choice experiment. For this
to be the case we need only that risk preferences in the two contexts are correlated.
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The moment functionapproach is implemented using:
V G;Momentitm = e
i

itm +
 i
2

0
2
itm +
 
2itm
1 (5)
where itm is the expected payo¤ faced by individual i in alternative t in gamble m, and 
2
itmis the
variance of that payo¤, with 0 and 1 to be estimated along with individual-specic parameters i
and  i. When 0 = 1 = 1; equation [5] takes the form that would be derived from a second order
Taylor approximation of an expected utility function6, where  i is proportional to the Pratt-Arrow
measure of absolute risk aversion. We implement and compare 4 formulations of the Moment model.
Moment model 1 is unrestricted. However, in portfolio theory the utility function is more commonly
specied without the quadratic term on payo¤ (0 = 0) and Moment models 2-4 are variants of this.
In Moment model 2 0 is constrained to be zero while 1is unrestricted. In Moment model 3 0 = 0
and 1 = 1. Within the literature on risk aversion it has been suggested (Epstein and Zin, 1990) that
the standard deviation may be a better predictor of behavior than the variance which gives Moment
model 4 (0 = 0; 1 =
1
2).
In estimating the parameters using non-linear mixed logit models a gumbel error is added to equations
[4] and [5] in which case the probability of a given choice takes a logistic form. The parameters of
interest are g (i) = (!i; i; i; ') for [4] where ' is an additional parameter representing the scale
variance of the Gumbel error, and g (i) = (i;  i; 0; 1) for [5]. The i are assumed to be normally
distributed with a mean and covariance (potentially conditioned on individualscharacteristics); with
constant parameters (0, 1) having zero variance.
In the expected utility model we assumed that all parameters !i; i; i were log normal, therefore
the utility function imposed increasing relative risk aversion, with absolute risk aversion free to be
decreasing, increasing or constant. Within the Moment model i and  i was specied as normal (or
conditionally normal). The parameter 0 was constrained to lie on the unit interval by specifying
0 =
e0
1+e0 where the parameter 0 could take any real value: The parameter 1 was constrained to
6Dene w=wealth, x= payo¤ with a distribution f (x) then U (w + x) ' U (w) + U 0 (w)x+ U00(w)
2
x2
) E (U (w + x)) / E (x) + 1
2
U00(w)
U0(w) E
 
x2

where E
 
x2

= E (x  E (x))2 + E (x)2
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be strictly positive by specifying 1 = e
1 where 1 could take any real value.
7.2 Modelling Essay Choices
To model essay choices we employ a mixed logit model with discrete mixing distributions (McFadden
and Train, 2000)7. This specication of the mixed logit considers there to be a nite number of
discrete classes of preferences. We believe a priori that preferences toward cheating are polarized
with some students strongly averse to entering the market whereas others will, to varying degrees, be
open to purchase depending on institutional parameters and the interplay between their own abilities
and the characteristics of the essays available. Hence we seek in estimation to identify the number
of discrete classes that best approximate the choice behavior observed, noting that as the number of
classes increases in the limit the model approximates the continuous mixed logit model.
We model the utility associated with an essay as a linear-in-parameters function of P attributes, the
levels of which vary across the m alternatives. Additionally, we assume that there are a number of
discrete latent classes (x = 1; ::::K) within the sample, which di¤er with respect to the parameters of
the utility function. We dene the class specic vector of parameters as attx =
 
attx1 ; ::::
att
xP
0 and the
set of all parameters as att =

attx
	K
x=1
. The vector of essay attributes faced by the ith individual in
set t is zitm = (zitm1; :::::zitmP )0 and, as above, we denote Zit = fzitmgMm=1. The systematic component
of utility for a member of class x, is modelled as:
V Essay
mjx;zitm;att =
XP
p=1
attxp zitmp (6)
The attributes in (6) are dened as the price and grade of the essay being purchased (dened as
dummy variables) and the risk-penalty regime in which it is available. We specify the risk and penalty
attributes as a combined term (Table 2) since the risk attribute has little intuitive meaning if there is
no penalty, and vice versa.
7Other models estimated permitted investigation of misreported preferences, which seemed credible in the context of
students being asked about plagiarism. The issue of misreporting can be addressed in the elicitation process, for example
by using randomised response techniques (see Caudill and Mixon 2005), or the estimation process. We investigated the
issue via estimation of models (see Balcombe et al, 2007, 2009) which allow for misreporting but found no evidence of
systematic misreporting (results available upon request).
13
Table 2 here
Dening att = fx0; x1; ::; x3; x1; ::; x4; gKx=1, we specify the systematic component of utility that
person i derives from essay m in choice set t, conditional on being a member of class x, as:
V Essay
mjx;att;zit = x0pricetm +
X3
g=1
xggradetmg +
X4
r=1
xrRPtmr (7)
where:
gradetmg is the grade of the essay in alternative m in choice set t.
For essays o¤ered for purchase this is the level of the grade attribute
(specied as g dummies for a 1st through to 3rd class essay, the latter
used as the baseline: see Table 1).
For the none option this will be the respondents self-predicted
grade (1st through to 3rd class, since no student predicted they would
fail)
pricetm is the price of the essay in alternative m in choice set t;
RPtmr is the risk/penalty regime (specied as dummies, see Table 2) oper-
ational in alternative m within choice set t.
xr is the utility associated with risk-penalty level r, for members of class
x.
Introducing latent classes, we re-state (2) as:
P (yit = m j x;Zit; att) =
exp

V Essay
mjx;zitm;att

PM
m0=1 exp

V Essay
m0jx;zitm0 ;att
 (8)
We explicitly model class membership using a multinomial logit functional form, based on a J  1
vector of characteristics Ci and a set of parameters  = fxgKx=1 where x = (x0;x1:::::xJ) such
that:
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P (x j Ci;) =
exp
 
SxjCi;x
PK
x0=1 exp
 
Sx0jCi;x0
 (9)
where:
SxjCi;x = x0 +
XJ
j=1
xjCij (10)
and the restriction
PK
x=1xj = 0 is imposed for purposes of identication.
The likelihood of individual i making their sequence of choices over the T choice sets faced is:
P (yi j fZitgTt=1 ; Ci; att;) =
XK
x=1
P (x j Ci;)
YT
t=1
P
 
yit j x;Zit; att

(11)
where yi is the vector of all responses by the ith individual. The likelihood function is therefore the
product of (11) over all individuals in the sample. Estimation proceeds by maximizing this likelihood
with respect to att and .
8 Results
We recruited 90 students. Descriptive statistics for the sample, split by their English as an Additional
language (EAL) status, is provided in Table A1 of the online appendix. The gender split of the sample
was 57% female, 43% male, with all but one of the 90 participants in the 18-24 age range. The sample
comprised both humanities and science students, 72 spoke English as their rst language and 83% had
taken their pre-University examinations in a UK educational institution. Ten of the 90 students knew
one or more people who had bought an essay (22% of the EAL students, 8% of non EAL) and ten had
been warned over their use of sources previously (17% of the EAL students, 10% of non EAL). The
studentspredictions for their coursework are also shown in the table, while the proportions predicting
Upper and Lower Second Grades is stable between EAL and non-EAL students there are marked
di¤erences at the top and bottom of the grade ladder: EAL students more likely to predict a low pass,
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non-EAL more likely to predict a top grade.
8.1 Gamble Choice Results
The proportion choosing each of the paired gambles are shown in Table A2 in the online Appendix.
Mixed logit models of the alternative gamble choice specications [4] and [5] are estimated using
Bayesian methods (Train 2003; Balcombe et al., 2009) with i,  i conditioned on the individuals
characteristics (studentsgender8 and university). Mixed logit estimation involves estimation of the
parameters (mean and variance) which dene the distribution from which the preferences of those in
the sample are drawn. Estimation yields individual-level point estimates of risk aversion, conditional
on that distribution and an individuals choices.
The performance of the EU and four formulations of the Moment model are reported in the online
Appendix. We restrict ourselves here to noting that the EU model is outperformed by all the Moment
models. The model which performed best on predicting gamble choices was Moment Model 4 (87%
gamble choices predicted) in which linearity in the standard deviation was imposed (1 =
1
2). We note
that the correlation in the estimates of risk aversion is very high (0.97 - 0.99) for Moment models 1,
2 and 4.
We report (Table 3) the full results of the Standard Deviation Moment model in which the means of
the distributions of i and  i are conditioned on studentsuniversity (A;B;C) and gender (female=1
for females):9
V Gmjitm;itm;i = exp(0i + BBi + CCi + femalefemalei)
itm +
0i + BBi + CCi +  femalefemalei
2
itm

(12)
8See Booth and Nolen (2012) for more on the evidence regarding, and possible causes of, gender di¤erences in risk
aversion.
9Using j
; D to denote a draw of  from its conditional distribution given 
 and D, with D denoting the data (choices
made by all individuals), estimation proceeds by taking some arbitrary starting values of  and 
 and proceeding to
draw figj;
; D then  j
; D; fig and then 
j;D; fig;and repeating this sequence for g= 1,...,G. The rst gdraws
are disregarded so that the draws are approximately independent of their starting values. Accordingly, the draws for
{igg from each iteration g of the chain can be recorded. The priors for all  estimated were normal with mean zero
with covariance I.
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The upper panel of Table 3 reports the mean and standard deviations of the estimates of the mean of the
distributions of  and  for the base group (0; 0; University A, males) and the terms which shift the
means of these parametersdistribution by University (C , B; B,C) and gender (female, female).
The lower panel of Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviations of the estimates of the variance
of the distributions of  and  . The estimates of  indicate the degree to which di¤erent groups tend
to avoid standard deviation in the gamble.
Clearly the more negative  , the more risk averse. The fact that in Table 3 the standard deviations for
the group estimates for  have mean estimates of around 1.8 greater than their standard deviations
suggests that they are moderately signicant, in the sense that if we treated these as classical estimates
they would be signicant at at around a 10% level of signicance. In behavioral terms there is a
substantive di¤erence in that we can see that for some of the universities there is tendency for students
to actually be risk liking as opposed to risk averse. This is also reected in the kernal density plots in
Figure 3.
Table 3 here
The estimate of var() indicates signicant heterogeneity around the means of the distributions for
each university-gender combination. Students at University A are more risk averse (0= -0.265) than
the rest of the sample, since increases in  represent increasing preference for risk. Males are less risk
averse than females ( female= -0.286), ceteris paribus, consistent with past ndings (see Charness and
Gneezy, 2012). The degree of the heterogeneity in risk aversion is evident in Figure 3, a kernel density
plot of the distribution of students risk preference coe¢ cients ( i). While we can say that there
appears to be a range of individuals that are risk averse through to risk seeking, it is more di¢ cult to
make a comment about whether this range of  constitutes a meaningful di¤erence in risk attitudes.
Figure 3 here
The primary motivation of deriving individual-specic measures of risk aversion ( i) is to assess
whether these risk preferences play a signicant role in the model of essay choice. We consider the
value of these risk aversion estimates further when discussing the models estimated on essay choice
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data in the following section.
8.2 Essay Choice Results
Each respondent was presented with 8 essay choice sets, leading to 720 choice occasions in total. Half
of the sample indicated they would buy at least one of the essays o¤ered, whereas half never opted
for a purchased essay. The proportion of buyerswas stable across the 3 universities. The frequency
of purchasewas variable across the sample, with 7 people indicating they would buy on all eight
occasions while ten people opted to buyon only one of the 8 choice occasions.
Latent class models, using the utility function specication in (7), are estimated. While it is possible
to segment the sample into classes on the basis only of choices, individual characteristics may be
used additionally to explain class membership (see equation 9). Two characteristics were found to
be consistently signicant: English not being the students rst language and the individuals degree
of risk aversion,  i, derived from the gamble experiment1011. A number of variables were tested as
class membership predictors but proved insignicant. These included gender and university identier
(although these were included in the estimation of  i), whether the student had a part time job (a
possible indicator of greater time pressure) or had previously been warned about their use of sources.
Estimation requires the number of classes to be specied ex ante. We follow current practice (Hensher
and Greene, 2003; Train, 2008) of using information criteria (IC) to compare model specications.
The Bayesian Information Criterion and Consistent Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC) support a
2 class specication and it is results from this specication which we report in Table 4.
Table 4 here
The model correctly predicts 83 percent of the essay choices. For both classes the price term is
10We note that  is an estimated term with an associated standard error. The complexity of incorporating that error
within the multinomial logit class membership model within a latent class model means that the uncertainty in  is not
captured within the essay choice model.
11We tested whether EAL status and estimates of  i were signicantly correlated with stated willingness to cheat in
a reduced form model. Both terms were signicant in a probit model in which the dependent variable was whether a
person boughtone or more essays in the essay choice experiment. Predictions from a probit model featuring only  i
correctly predict the (non) buying status of 60 of the sample of 90.
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negative and there is the expected progression of increased utility from essays of higher grade. A
striking di¤erence between the two classes occurs in the impact of changes in the risk-penalty regime.
For Class 2, the risk-penalty coe¢ cients show an intuitive progression from positive and signicant
(for the most lax) through to a large negative and signicant value for the most stringent regime,
RP4. For Class 2 many grade upgrades, under several risk-penalty regimes, generate a net utility
gain, implying that this segment represents those who are willing to enter into the market if they
consider the conditions right. For Class 1 the marginal utilities for risk-penalty are all negative from
RP1 through to RP4 and the utility gain from moving from the lowest grade of paper (a 3rd) to the
highest grade (a 1st) would cause a net utility loss under all risk-penalty regimes except RP2. Even
in that case, the net utility gain from buying ones way from the bottom to the top pass grade is very
small. This suggests that for this class of person, if they predict they will pass (however low their
grade), there is almost no incentive to participate in the market.
Not having English as a rst language is found to be determinant of class membership: those without
English as a rst language (EAL=1) are signicantly more likely to be a member of Class 2. In
addition, those who are less risk averse (larger ) are more likely to be members of Class 2 and hence
more likely to enter the essay market.
A fuller assessment of the interpretation of the behaviors represented by the 2-class model of essay
choice requires a formal consideration of willingness to pay (WTP) for essays, and predicted prob-
abilities of purchase. This analysis requires consideration of an additional piece of information: the
individualsexpectation of the grade they would receive for their own work. This is considered next.
8.3 Essay Valuations and Probabilities of Purchase
Choice experiment data permit estimation of both the value associated with a marginal change in an
attribute level and the value associated with switching from one alternative to another. The DCE
design was such that the purchased essayoptions always featured a non-zero level of risk and penalty,
while the buy noneoption always featured zero risk and penalty. Hence the risk-penalty variables
collectively represent both the risk-penalty characteristics of a purchased essay and other, unstated,
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elements associated with purchasing an essay. This value is subsumed into the estimate of the 4 risk-
penalty parameters; there is e¤ectively a xed component associated with purchasing any essay that
is independent of its qualities. This is the net e¤ect of both positive (savings in time and e¤ort) and
negative (disutility from dishonesty) aspects of purchase. 12.
Derivation of the value of an essay to a student must take account of the papers quality and cost, the
risk-penalty regime under which it is bought, and the risk preferences and English Language status of
the student as well as their own-grade expectation.
The WTP for a paper will be individual- and class-specic and can be identied as that price (priceigr)
at which student i becomes indi¤erent between buying an essay of grade g under risk-penalty regime
r and submitting their own work. We dene self predicted grade as P and hence xP represents
the utility from submitting ones own paper in the expectation of that grade. Student i is therefore
indi¤erent between purchase and submission of their own work when:
xP = x0price

igr + xg + xr (13)
Rearranging (13) yields the maximum price at which the student will purchase:
priceigr =
xP   xg   xr
x0
(14)
The parameters in (14) will be class (x) specic and hence one can generate conditional WTP values
for each class, or an unconditional value based on the expected probability of class membership.
WTP for essays in specic conditions are obtained through simulation. Taking 1000 random draws
of the parameters, based on a multivariate normal distribution and utilizing the estimated variance
covariance matrix of the parameters, a distribution of simulated WTP values is generated (Krinsky
and Robb, 1986). This distribution yields median WTP and associated condence intervals13 for each
12Decomposition of these e¤ects would require essays that could be bought with zero risk of detection; including such
options in the design was thought too unrealistic.
13The signicance of a WTP value is based on a 1-tail test since our concern is identifying statistically signicant
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essay type. These WTP values are displayed in Figure 4 (and in Table A4 in the online appendix
with 95 percent condence intervals for those values which are signicantly positive).
Each of the four panels in Figure 4 shows how WTP varies with the grade the student expects if they
submit their own work. Within each panel the WTP is shown for each combination of the 4 essay
grades one could buy and the 4 risk-penalty regimes. Only signicant WTP values are shown. In the
rst panel, representing students who predict their own work would receive a 1st grade mark, an essay
will only be purchased if it is also of a 1st standard and only within the least stringent risk-penalty
regime, RP1. The value of such a paper is £ 93 and represents the amount the individual is prepared
to pay to avoid the work needed to submit their own work in that risk-penalty environment; there is
no grade upgrade involved, only the avoidance of work.
While the results do not allow the decomposition of the some of the xed gains from buying an essay
(savings in time and e¤ort, utility from having outwitted the system, etc.) we can infer something
about the value of time. For example, it must exceed £ 92 pounds for Class 2 since this is the amount
that respondents are prepared to pay for an essay of the same grade as they predict for their own work.
While the results do not allow the decomposition of the some of the xed gains from buying an essay
(savings in time and e¤ort, utility from having outwitted the system) we can infer something about
the value of time. For example, it must exceed £ 92 pounds for Class 2 since this is the amount that
respondents are prepared to pay for an essay of the same grade as they predict for their own work.
Inspection of the other panels reveals that as the studentspredicted grade falls, WTP for all essays
increases, up to a maximum of £ 277 for a 1st grade essay bought by a student expecting a 3rd, under
the low detection, low penalty regime, RP1. There is never a positive WTP for an essay under the
most severe risk-penalty regime (RP4).
Figure 4 here
We now consider the probability that a student will purchase coursework. This requires evaluation
of the probability that a member of each class will purchase an essay, combined with the probability
positive WTP values.
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of class membership for a specic individual. The former requires assumptions about the cost and
grade of the purchased paper, the buyers own predicted grade, and the risk-penalty regime in place.
The latter, the probability of class membership, is determined by English language status and risk
preference. Figure 5a shows the probability of purchasing a 1st grade essay for £ 200, if the student
has English as a rst language and predicts they would attain a 3rd level grade. The evolution of the
probability as the individuals risk aversion changes is displayed for each of the risk-penalty regimes.
Figure 5b displays these purchase probabilities for a student also expecting a 3rd level grade but
without English as a rst language. These gures show the very low probability of purchase under
the most severe risk-penalty regime, and the relatively high probability of purchase under the lowest
risk-penalty regime. The role of English as a rst language in our sample is also highlighted here, such
that a student who has English as their rst language and low risk aversion has a similar probability
of purchase as a student for whom English is not their rst language and strong risk aversion. For
those with English as an additional language, the distribution of  within the sample is such that
approximately 75 percent of this sub-sample have a probability of purchase in excess of 50 percent
when the risk-penalty regime is at its most lax (RP1).
Figure 5 here
We are wary of making general inferences from the powerful EAL e¤ect observed in this small sample
of 90 students (of whom only 18 are EAL students). However it does resonate with some previous
ndings. Bretag (2013) reviews empirical evidence on the relationship between EAL status and aca-
demic malpractice including Marshall and Garrys (2006) nding that EAL students were more likely
to have committed serious plagiarism than non-EAL counterparts, Vieyra et al.s (2013) nding that
47% of EAL graduate students had committed plagiarism in research proposals and Bretag et als
(2013) nding that international students were more than twice as likely as domestic counterparts to
be uncondent regarding the avoidance of breaches of academic integrity.
Some caution is also required when assessing the valuations and purchase probabilities since our essay
choice models are based on stated preferences. When considering the potential for hypothetical bias
one is wary of systematic misreporting of preferences. In particular, choice experiments in which
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there is a warm glowassociated with certain options are at risk of over-valuing those products and
attributes. In the case of essays it might be the case that students did not treat the choices su¢ ciently
seriously and over-report their willingness to buy. However, there may be an opposite e¤ect: the fear
of self incrimination may have caused respondents to under-report their willingness to buy since the
experiments were conducted on-campus, under the supervision of academics. The warm glow of giving
might have been replaced by the cold fear of self-incrimination. The net e¤ect of these pressures to
over- and under-report is unknown.
The papersvaluations under risk-penalty regimes RP2 and RP3 are very similar. Thus the movement
from low to high penalty can be o¤set for the buyer by a shift from high to low risk of detection. The
information asymmetries and associated quality uncertainty in the market about whether a purchased
paper is truly original will translate into higher risks of detection. Thus the market constraining
impact of lemon essays in reducing incentives for plagiarism can be o¤set by low penalties if caught.
However it is only when both the risk of being caught and the penalty are high that students in
Class 2 are deterred from entering the market at all. Thus, although it may be encouraging that the
essay market is characterized by information asymmetries, universities also have to provide su¢ ciently
negative incentives, via su¢ ciently harsh penalties, to constrain the market.
It should also be noted that the lowlevel of the penalty attribute (zero mark for the course unit) is
more severe than the penalty that is applied in many institutions for a rst o¤ence (Tennant et al.,
2007) and so WTP is expected to be higher under these more lax regimes. Also, no student predicted
they would fail and therefore we can not estimate WTP nor the probability of its purchase, for such
students. We expect their valuations, and their likelihood of entering the market for papers, to be
higher than those reported here.
9 Conclusions
This paper is the rst formal economic investigation of the demand for essays. It reports university
studentswillingness to buy, and their valuations of, bespoke papers from commercial providers. To
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investigate the demand for papers accurately it is necessary to pose the option to buy with respect
to a realistic scenario. An individuals willingness to buy may di¤er across course units hence it is
necessary to frame the choices with respect to a specic piece of work. This approach is employed
using choice experiments with 90 students at 3 UK universities. Given the anticipated role of risk
preferences in the decision to cheat, a consequential gambling experiment is conducted, from which
individual specic risk preferences are derived. In the hypothetical essay choice experiment students
revealed their willingness to purchase an essay for submission for credit.
We nd women to be more risk averse than men. Students who are less risk averse and have English as
an additional language are more likely to buy. The small sample size of 90 cautions against making
any general claims, but the ndings that EAL status is a strong predictor in the latent class essay
choice model and 15 of the 18 EAL students opted to buyon one or more occasion is notable. This
EAL e¤ect resonates with ndings from other studies in the plagiarism literature. Half of the sample
refuse to buyan essay in all of the 8 choice sets. This may represent pure aversion to dishonesty or
reect that the combined e¤ects of risk, price and grade attributes are insu¢ cient to persuade partially
dishonest respondents to enter the hypothetical market. Of the 45 students who opted to buyat least
once, only 7 of them opted for purchase on all 8 choice occasions. This, and the signicant estimated
e¤ects of the essaysattributes, suggest that respondents carefully evaluated essay characteristics when
considering engaging in contract cheating. The WTP value for some in the sample reaches £ 277 ($445)
for a 1st grade piece of work. The valuations decline with the quality of the essay, increases in risk
and penalty and the students own-grade expectation.
Further analysis of the demand for essays would be enriched by a greater understanding of the atti-
tudes and norms of the students and their peer groups. Given the experimental evidence on lying, a
better understanding of student perspectives on the negative e¤ects, if any, of cheating on others, and
how this varies between traditional and contract cheating, would aid understanding of the markets
development. Similarly, the degree to which contract cheating challenges the self-concept of (which)
students in a more profound and troubling way than copy and paste plagiarism will also shed light on
the growth of the essay market. As the market grows the justication that such behavior is necessary
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to keep up with other cheaters will be reinforced, further fuelling essay market growth.
Knowledge of the variability in the time it would take students to write, rather than buy, papers
and their opportunity costs of time would also enrich further work on contract cheating. A critical
aspect of the market which should be incorporated in further work is uncertainty about the quality
of the paper being purchased. In this study buyers were assured that the essay purchased would be
of the stated grade. Asymmetric information and the fear of buying a lemon may well prevent some
buyers in this hypothetical study from participating in the real market. In this case the activities
of reputable (and disreputable) companies to reduce (increase) the information asymmetries facing
buyers will signicantly a¤ect the growth of the market in essays. Another extension to make the
choice experiment more closely resemble the market would be to incorporate time pressure. Many
essay providers charge higher prices for quicker turnarounds: an essay needed within 48 hours is
typically more expensive than one required a month later.
We consider it remarkable how many students, in a study administered by academics, indicate a
willingness to buy. The assurances of condentiality were genuine but the level of purchasing indicated
was contrary to the expectations of both the authors and their colleagues. Why is there such an
apparent lack of stigma in revealing a willingness to purchase essays? It may be that the ethical line
that most Faculty perceive as being crossed when such purchases are made is not that signicant to
many students. At a time when the university student is increasingly treated as a consumer demanding
value for money it would appear that subcontracting some of the work required to achieve their degree
is seen as a rational choice for many consumers on campus.
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Table 1: Essay attributes and levels
Attribute Levels
Essay grade 1st class, 2(i), 2(ii), 3rd class
Risk of being caught None, 1/1000, 1/100
Penalty None, 0% for course unit, Repeat the year
Price £ 100, £ 50, £ 75, £ 25
30
Table 2: A combined risk-penalty measure
Probability of detection Penalty risk-penalty dummy
1/1000 0% for the course unit RP1
1/1000 repeat the year RP2
1/100 0% for the course unit RP3
1/100 repeat the year RP4
31
Table 3: Parameter estimates: mixed logit model on gamble choices
Mean Standard deviation
0 0.947 0.274
uni_B -0.201 0.362
uni_C 0.243 0.445
female 0.238 0.312
0 -0.265 0.162
uni_B 0.347 0.186
uni_C 0.392 0.214
 female -0.286 0.166
var (0i) 0.702 0.424
var (0i) 0.333 0.097
cov (0i; 0i) -0.264 0.174
N=720; LMargL = -284.62
32
Table 4: A 2 class model of essay choice.
Utility functions: Class 1 Class 2
Attributes Coe¢ cient standard error Coe¢ cient standard error
price -0.029 0.013 -0.014 0.005
RP1 -3.314 1.371 1.284 0.489
RP2 -2.884 1.142 0.106 0.392
RP3 -3.628 1.167 0.399 0.393
RP4 -4.323 1.260 -2.053 0.524
grade_2(ii) 0.737 0.979 0.999 0.366
grade_2(i) 0.935 0.965 1.885 0.339
grade_1st 3.088 0.970 2.609 0.352
Class membership:
Intercept 0.484 0.208 -0.484 0.208
EAL -1.283 0.373 1.283 0.373
 -0.722 0.315 0.722 0.315
N=720; LL = -367.637
33
Figure 1: An example essay choice set
33
Figure 2: An example gamble choice set
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Figure 4: WTP for Essays of Di¤ering Grade, by Own Grade Expectation and Risk-Penalty Regime
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Figure 5: Probability of a student who is expecting a 3rd grade buying a 1st Class essay for £ 200,
under each risk-penalty regime, as  varies
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A1 
 
Online Appendix for the paper ‘Contract Cheating & the Market in Essays’ 
 
Table A1. Sample Descriptives, by EAL status 
 
All      EAL =0 EAL =1 
n mean sd min max  n mean sd min max n mean sd min max 
female 90 0.567 0.498 0 1  72 0.653 0.479 0 1 18 0.222 0.428 0 1 
knowbuyers 90 0.111 0.316 0 1  72 0.083 0.278 0 1 18 0.222 0.428 0 1 
ptjob 90 0.433 0.498 0 1  72 0.431 0.499 0 1 18 0.444 0.511 0 1 
warn 90 0.111 0.316 0 1  72 0.097 0.298 0 1 18 0.167 0.383 0 1 
                  
dcebuyer 90 0.500 0.503 0 1  72 0.417 0.496 0 1 18 0.833 0.383 0 1 
tau 90 -0.254 0.491 -1.236 0.781  72 -0.279 0.469 -1.236 0.770 18 -0.151 0.576 -1.235 0.781 
 
 
Own Grade prediction 
 All    EAL =0   EAL =1     
40-49% 4 0.04  40-49% 1 0.01 40-49% 3 0.17 
50-59% 26 0.29  50-59% 21 0.29 50-59% 5 0.28 
60-69% 47 0.52  60-69% 38 0.53 60-69% 9 0.50 
70%+ 13 0.14  70%+ 12 0.17 70%+ 1 0.06 
    
 
Variable definitions 
EAL 1 = English is an Additional Language , 0 otherwise 
female 1 = female , 0 otherwise 
knowbuyers 1= know someone who has bought essay , 0 otherwise 
ptjob 1= had a part time job , 0 otherwise 
warn 1= been warned over source use , 0 otherwise 
dcebuyer 1= hypothetically bought 1+ essay in DCE , 0 otherwise 
tau estimate of relative risk aversion  
A2 
 
Table A2. Gamble Choice Descriptives 
 
          
  Game Gamble S (safe) Gamble R (risky) % Choosing S  
    
  1 1/10 of s1, 9/10 of s2 1/10 of r1, 9/10 of r2 91.11 
    
  2 2/10 of s1, 8/10 of s2 2/10 of r1, 8/10 of r2 81.61 
    
  3 3/10 of s1, 7/10 of s2 3/10 of r1, 7/10 of r2 84.09 
    
  4 4/10 of s1, 6/10 of s2 4/10 of r1, 6/10 of r2 68.97 
    
  5 5/10 of s1, 5/10 of s2 5/10 of r1, 5/10 of r2 50.57 
    
  6 6/10 of s1, 4/10 of s2 6/10 of r1, 4/10 of r2 35.63 
    
  7 7/10 of s1, 3/10 of s2 7/10 of r1, 3/10 of r2 11.36 
    
  8 8/10 of s1, 2/10 of s2 8/10 of r1, 2/10 of r2 14.94 
          
  Notes:   
  Payoffs:   
  Uni A s1= £2; s2=£1 r1= £3; r2=£0.2   
  Uni B, C s1= £4; s2=£3 r1= £8; r2=£0.2   
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Expected Utility and Moment approaches to deriving individual level Risk Preferences  
 
 
The comparison between EUT and Moment approaches is based on the expected utility of a gamble 
between two monetary amounts  and ∗  with probabilities  and 1 −  . These are 
defined in the paper for EUT as: 
 	
, =  + 1 − ∗  (4) 
 
and for the ‘moment function’ approach as: 
 	
, =   + 2 !"# + $# %&' (5) 
 
in which  is the expected payoff faced by individual ( in alternative ) in gamble *, and $# is the 
variance of that payoff, with !" and !+ to be estimated along with individual-specific parameters , 
and .  
When !" = !+ = 1, equation [5] takes the form that would be derived from a second order Taylor 
approximation of an expected utility function1, where  is proportional to the Pratt-Arrow measure of 
absolute risk aversion.  
We implement and compare 4 formulations of the Moment model. Moment model 1 is unrestricted. 
However, in portfolio theory the utility function is more commonly specified without the quadratic 
term on payoff (!" = 0) and Moment models 2-4 are variants of this. In Moment model 2 !" is 
constrained to be zero while !+is unrestricted. In Moment model 3 !" = 0 and !+ = 1. Within the 
literature on risk aversion it has been suggested (Epstein and Zin, 1990) that the standard deviation 
may be a better predictor of behavior than the variance which gives Moment model 4 (!" = 0, 
!+ = +#).  
The performance of the EU model and the four formulations of the Moment model were evaluated 
using 2 criteria. In the first (predictive power) the individuals’ gamble choices are compared against 
those predicted from the individual level utility function estimates. In the second we calculate the 
Marginal Likelihood (LMargL) for each model (following Balcombe et al. 2011). The LMargL is a 
general Bayesian method for model comparison, able to compare models which are non-nested and 
differ in the number of parameters. If there is no difference in the prior odds of two models then the 
ratio of their Marginal Likelihoods gives the posterior odds of one over the other. The results on both 
criteria are presented in Table A3. 
  
                                                          
1  Define =wealth, .= payoff with a distribution /. then  + . ≃  + 1. + 223# .# 
 ⇒ 5 + . ∝ 5. + +# 
223
23 5.# where 5.# = 5. − 5.# + 5.#  
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Table A3. Gamble choice model performance  
 
 prediction  LMargL  
 ( % correct)  
Expected Utility Model  81.7 -301.12  
Moment Model 1: 0 < !" < 1;!+ > 0  82.7 -292.52  
Moment Model 2: !" = 0;!+ > 0  83.5 -282.38  
Moment Model 3: !" = 0;!+ = 1 (Var Model)  86.5 -299.25  
Moment Model 4: !" = 0;!+ = +# (St.Dev Model)  87.2 -284.62  
 
It is apparent from Table A3 that the EU model is outperformed by all the Moment models on both 
criteria (LMargL and Prediction). The highest LMargL is for Moment model 2 with !" = 0 but !+ 
estimated, suggesting that #  played no useful role in model performance. In Moment models 1 and 
2 the estimates of !+ were 0.32 and 0.23 respectively, suggesting the model was not linear in variance 
(since that would imply !+ = 1. These estimates suggest that even ‘first order’ risk (!+ = +#) 
overstates the power to which the gamble standard deviation should be raised.  
Imposing linearity in variance (!+ = 1 (Moment model 3) caused the LMargL to deteriorate 
markedly. However the predictive power of this linear in variance model still outperformed the more 
general Moment model 2. Likewise, when linearity in the standard deviation was imposed (Moment 
model 4, !+ = +#, there was a decline in the LMargL relative to Moment model 2, however this fall 
was small and the estimates of individuals’ risk preferences from this model performed best in 
predicting gamble choices.  It is this Standard Deviation Moment model which is used in the paper, 
when describing the distribution of risk preferences in the sample and within the essay choice model.  
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Table A4.  Value of essays for Class 2, by predicted grade and risk-penalty regime. 
 
  Grade of essay purchased                     
Predicted grade  Risk-Penalty  1st 2(i)  2( ii)  3rd   
      
   :;+  277  228  164  92   
  (184-613)  (149-491)  (89-364)  (48-166)   
3rd :;#  194  142  79   
  (130-419)  (90-291)  (21-172)   
 :;<  214  163  100   
  (137-469)  (95-372)  (37-232)   
 :;+  206  156  92   
  (148-412)  (108-284)  (49-165)   
2(ii) :;#  123  71    
  (86-222)  (19-120)    
 :;<  143  92    
  (96-288)  (37-174)    
 :;+  142  92    
  (96-297)  (48-167)    
2(i) :;#  60     
  (21-108)     
 :;<  80     
  (45-163)     
1st   :;+  93     
  (51-166)     
note:  
95% confidence intervals are displayed for those WTP values which are significantly positive. 
 
Today’s Survey 
• The training you have received about the correct use of 
sources/references.
• The extent to which you think there is misuse of sources at the 
University
• Your assessment of detection rates and associated penalties for 
the misuse of sources.
Today’s Survey I 
We are also going to present you with some scenarios and ask you to 
indicate what you would do in each of them.
These scenarios involve this year’s
|Course Code | Course Title| Essay
Present you with a series of choices, in each case they involve 
obtaining your |Course Code | Course Title| Essay by other 
means.
Today’s Survey II 
Finally, you are going to be asked to choose some lotteries to play. 
In each case, you’ll just have to choose whether to play Lottery A or 
Lottery B.
We will then play out one of these games at the end of the session 
and calculate your winnings.
These winnings will be in addition to the £8 payment for taking part, 
which is guaranteed.
Anonymity
Timing
35 minutes on the survey
We collect the questionnaires (you keep the single sheet)
5 minutes to play the gamble
You exchange your single sheet for payment
How the gamble is played
A volunteer will come to the front and use the Random Number 
generator in Excel, displayed on the big screen.
This will determine:
• Which gamble is played (1-8)
• The outcome of the gamble
| 1-10 |                                      11-100                                  |
| 1-10 |                                      11-100                                  |
| 1-10 |                                      11-100                                  |
| 1-10 |                                      11-100                                  |
Generate a random number between 1 & 100
| 1-10 |                                      11-100                                  |
| 1-10 |                                      11-100                                  |
Number 
between 1 & 10: 
winnings are 
shown here for 
Games A&B
| 1-10 |                                      11-100                                  |
| 1-10 |                                      11-100                                  |
Number 
between 1 & 10: 
winnings are 
shown here for 
Games A&B
Number between 11 & 100: winnings are 
shown here for Games A&B
Payment
Payment in cash occurs at the end of the session
The payment comprises your:
• participation fee (guaranteed)
• gamble payout
